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compressed sensing
Li Zeng1*, Xiongwei Zhang1, Liang Chen2, Zhangjun Fan2 and Yonggang Wang2Abstract
Conventional speech scramblers have three disadvantages, including heavy communication overhead, signal
features underexploitation, and low attack resistance. In this study, we propose a scrambling-based speech
encryption scheme via compressed sensing (CS). Distinguished from conventional scramblers, the above problems
are solved in a unified framework by utilizing the advantages of CS. The presented encryption idea is general and
easily applies to speech communication systems. Compared with the state-of-the-art methods, the proposed
scheme provides lower residual intelligibility and greater cryptanalytic efforts. Meanwhile, it ensures desirable
channel usage and notable resistibility to hostile attack. Extensive experimental results also confirm the
effectiveness of the proposed scheme.
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Encryption, dating back to BC, is essential for informa-
tion security in modern society [1]. Information espio-
nages, including illegal surveillance and wiretapping,
have emerged due to the wide applications of speech
communication in national defense, economy and trade,
scientific research, and social affairs. With security an
ever more vital requisite of communications systems,
speech encryption has attracted substantial acceptance
as an effective means of enhancing protection in both
military and civilian applications.
Two main categories of technologies have been devel-
oped for this purpose. The first one is content protection
through encryption, e.g., speech scrambler [2-9]. Proper
decryption of the data requires a key or the so-called
scrambling matrix. The second one is digital watermark-
ing, which aims at embedding messages into the multi-
media data [10]. Intuitively, the time domain sample
scrambling method is thus far the most attractive and
desired, because it simply takes a segment of time do-
main sample values and directly scrambles them into a
different segment of samples. In this article, we focus on
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in any medium, provided the original work is pEarlier speech scramblers disorder the original signal
using specific sequence or matrix, such as pseudoran-
dom sequence, Fibonacci transform [2], Hadamard
matrix [3,4], and so on. The main disadvantage shared
by these methods is that the decryption key is invariable.
Since the performance of computer hardware has in-
credibly been improved, these methods could easily be
deciphered. To alleviate this problem, researchers pro-
posed to employ new key schedules, such as stochastic
matrix [5] and Latin square [6], to improve the strength
of security [7,8]. However, the improved algorithms also
result in heavy transmission load due to their disability
of compressing the original signal. Consequently, the
speech compression methods are integrated into the
process of encryption, e.g., G.729 mixed excitation linear
prediction (MELP) and AMR [9]. Indeed, the combin-
ation of compression and scrambling leads to less costly
encrypted data. But the parametric coding algorithms
are of low robustness in the presence of noise or other
hostile attacks. Besides, the performances of such algo-
rithms depend heavily upon the encryption operator,
and the character of speech itself is not well utilized.
More recently, researches in nonlinear process have
shown that the chaotic signal is very suitable for secure
communications. However, chaotic system is sensitive to
disturbance and requires strict self-synchronization,
which limits its practical applications [11,12].Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly cited.
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(deciphering difficulty) provided by a speech encryption
system is related to (1) residual intelligibility (the amount
of intelligibility left over in the encrypted signal) and (2)
keyspace (the number of keys available for encryption). In
general, the lower a scrambling system’s residual intelligi-
bility and the bigger its keyspace, the higher its degree of
security. After the propose of the stochastic approach [14],
the keyspace of a scrambler is commonly measured by the
number of encryption operators, namely the scrambling
matrix [3,4,6,13].
To summarize, a channel-saving and anti-attack speech
scrambler is a major issue to be addressed. In the mean-
time, it should attain residual intelligibility as low as pos-
sible and provide keyspace as large as possible to increase
the cryptogram immunity to cryptanalysis. Despite the
improvements achieved by the aforementioned works, few
investigations manage to simultaneously address these
problems. In light of this consideration, we apply com-
pressed sensing (CS) [15-17] to speech encryption, due to
its promising capability in signal compression and its not-
able robustness to hostile attacks.
In this article, we tackle the issue on scrambling-based
speech encryption via CS by exploiting the sparsity of
speech over the Karhunen–Loeve (K–L) incoherent dic-
tionary [18]. Distinguished from existing schemes, we
scramble the dimensional-reduced measurements instead
of the original speech. The algorithm proposed in this art-
icle is motivated by the following idea: if two independent
signals x1 and x2 are aliased and scrambled in the same
space by a stochastic matrix, the intelligibility of the original
signal can be eliminated, and it is hard for the eavesdrop-
pers to get any information barely from the mixture [19].
Observations show that the measurement vector of speech
exhibits noise-like nature. However, the envelope of com-
pressed data still retains considerable information of the
original speech [20,21], we therefore alias and scramble the
two measurement vectors of separated speech instead of
using the envelope as ciphered data directly.
To be specific, the presented scheme contains two
stages: encryption and decryption. At the encryption stage,
we compress and encrypt the speech. The original signal
is separated into two independent parts and sparsely
represented by the corresponding K–L incoherent dic-
tionaries. Next, the sparse vectors of the two parts are
measured by stochastic matrices. Afterwards, these low-
dimensional measurements are mixed and scrambled by
the scrambling matrix, which is constructed from the null
space basis (NSB) of the aligned sensing matrix using sin-
gular value decomposition (SVD). At the decryption stage,
the inverse operator is constructed to eliminate each
aliased measurements part individually. At last, the sepa-
rated speech parts are reconstructed using the orthogonal
matching pursuit (OMP) [22], and assembled to recoverthe speech. Experimental results demonstrate that the
encrypted signal of proposed scheme has low transmis-
sion cost and low residual intelligibility. It provides im-
mense cryptogram immunity and exhibits notable attack
resistance.
The rest of this article is outlined as follows. In Section
2, we introduce the K–L incoherent dictionary to
sparsely represent speech signals. Section 3 explains the
encryption idea that we seek to address, and expatiates
on the detailed procedure of encryption and decryption.
The residual intelligibility, encryption strength, and ro-
bustness performance of the proposed scheme, together
with experimental results, are presented and discussed
in Section 4. Conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
2. The sparse representation of speech
Sparse representation is a critical step of CS [16], since one
can obtain the dimension-reduced signal on the basis of
sparse vectors. In this section, we employ a practical sparsi-
fying dictionary to sparsely represent the speech signal.
The K–L expansion [18] describes a stochastic process in
the form of incoherent random principle components and
the corresponding deterministic orthogonal basis. Thus, the
main structure of the process can be captured by a few ex-
pansion terms. Assume a real second-order moment sto-
chastic process {x(t), t ∈ [0, 1]}, its K–L expansion is
x tð Þ ¼
X1
k¼1




1x(t)φk(t)dt. The orthogonal bases {φk(t)} are
eigenfunctions of the signal autocorrelation Rx(t,u). They
can be used to design the atoms of signal dictionary. {φk(t)}
and the corresponding eigenvalues yk satisfy the Fredholm
integral equation [18,23]
ykφk tð Þ ¼
Z 1
0
Rx t;uð Þφk uð Þdu ð2Þ
However, for a practical signal, Equation (2) is hard to
solve due to the complexity of the signal autocorrelation.
Since the autocorrelation of speech signal decreases rap-
idly within a low delay, we approximate it by the exponen-
tial function: Rx(t, u)=Rx(0)e
−μ|t−u|, where μ is the
attenuation coefficient. Substituting Rx(t,u) into (2) yields
ykϕ tð Þ ¼
Z 1
0
Rx t; uð Þϕ uð Þdu
¼ Rx 0ð Þ eμt
Z t
0






By solving (3) with the boundary conditions and elim-
inating the zero particular solution φ0(t)=0 (it cannot be
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cos kπtð Þ þ sin kπtð Þ; k∈Z ∖ 0f g ð4Þ
After adding φ0(t)=1, the complete orthogonal K–L
dictionary E is represented by
E ¼ φ0 tð Þf g⋃ φk tð Þ; k∈Z ∖ 0f g
  ð5Þ
where k stands for the number of atoms in the diction-
ary. For digital signal processing, the bases of E are
sampled in the range of 0≤t≤1 by uniform sampling. Let
μ* denote the optimal value of parameter μ, it is esti-
mated by solving the following optimization problem:
μ ¼ argmin
μ>0
Rx τð Þ  R^x μð Þ
 2
2 ð6Þ
where Rx τð Þ ¼ 1nτð Þ
Xnτ
i¼1 x ið Þx iþ τð Þ is the unbiased
estimation of the autocorrelation of speech frame x∈Rn
with delay τ and R^x τð Þ ¼ Rx 0ð Þeμ τj j; τ ¼ 0; 1;⋯; n 1.
Thus, the optimal discrete atoms are ek=[ek(1), . . ., ek(i),
. . ., ek(n)]
T, where
ek ið Þ ¼ kπ
μ∗
cos
kπ i 1ð Þ
n 1
 
þ sin kπ i ¼ 1ð Þ
n 1
 
i ¼ 1;⋯; nð Þ ð7Þ
Then add with e0=[1, . . . ,1]
T, we construct the
complete discrete speech dictionary as
D ¼ e0f g⋃ ek ; k∈Z ∖ 0f gf g ð8Þ
In this case, discrete uniform sampling changes the or-
thogonality of bases {φk(t)}. Though they are not math-
ematically orthogonal, atoms in D are of low coherence
and subsequently, D turns out to be an overcomplete in-
coherent dictionary.
Concisely, the presented dictionary is codetermined by
the sinusoidal atoms (given in (7)) and the parameter μ*.
The structure of the sinusoidal atoms is based on the
K–L expansion. It is the general paradigm of the diction-
ary, thus can be shared by both the compression and the
recovering part. On the other hand, μ* is affected by the
character of each frame. It determines the detailed struc-
ture of the current dictionary. Hence, with μ*, the corre-
sponding dictionary can be rebuilt to recover the
original speech in the recovering part.
Three types of speech frame (unvoiced, voiced, and
transition sound) and their corresponding sparse vectors
over the K–L incoherent dictionaries are shown in
Figure 1. Here, k is set equal to the length of a speech
frame.3. Proposed encryption scheme
This section details the specification of the proposed
scheme. Section 3.1 illustrates the derivation of proposed
encryption scheme. The course of scrambling matrix
designing is addressed in Section 3.2. Section 3.3
describes the decryption and recovering process.
3.1. CS-based scrambling
According to Candès and Wakin [17], the implication of
sparsity is now clear: when a signal has a sparse expan-
sion, one can discard the small coefficients without
much perceptual loss. Hence, some minor but non-zero
entries of the sparse vectors can be discarded before the
measuring to further reduce the compression rate. In
addition, they prove that, for a K-sparse signal s∈Rn and
a fixed basis Φ∈Rm×n with atoms selected uniformly at
random, the exact reconstruction of s from the measure-
ments y=Φs∈Rm (m≪n) is of overwhelming probability,
as long as the number of observations obeys
m≥C⋅K ⋅ logn ð9Þ
for some real positive constant C. In this case, the ori-
ginal speech is compressed and the compression ratio is
m:n. Here, we concentrate on the issue of speech en-
cryption, and the quality of reconstructed speech will be
given in Section 4.
The speech has proved to be a robust signal that can be
perturbed in many different ways while remaining intelli-
gible [24]. As depicted in Figure 2 (the compression ratio
is set as 1:20), though the measurement vector exhibits
some noise-like nature (Figure 2b), it is observed that the
envelopes (red, dashed line) of the original speech and the
compressed signal are of high similarity. This means
the CS retains considerable information within the low-
dimensional measurements.
Actually, neurons in the auditory brainstem sensitive
to speech envelope have been found in mammalian
physiological studies [25]. The envelope extracted using
the Hilbert transform reveal that the envelope is most
important for speech reception, namely the words are
identified according to the envelope [20]. Research on
the relationship between speech envelope and audio per-
ceptual comprehending is still intensely ongoing [26].
More recently, Mehmet Cenk et. al. [21] have investi-
gated the perceptual features for automatic emotion rec-
ognition with temporal envelopes.
Since the strong connection between residual intelligi-
bility and speech envelope, our goal aims to come up
with a new algorithm which is able to utilize the sparsity
of speech signal as well as to decrease the residual intel-
ligibility of the compressed data. In view of this consid-
eration, the CS-based scrambling approach is employed
for its straightforwardness.
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Voiced Frame (VF) sparse vector of VF
Transition Frame (TF) sparse vector of TF
Unvoiced Frame (UF) sparse vector of UF
Figure 1 Sparsity of three types of speech over K–L incoherent dictionary. The horizontal axes stand for the amplitudes of signals, the
vertical axes stand for the indices of vectors.
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matrix. It therefore can be used as the scrambling matrix
to decrease the residual intelligibility of the dimensional-
reduced signal. Nevertheless, we notice that the dimen-


















Figure 2 Comparison of the envelopes (red, dashed line) of original athat of the sensing matrix. In other words, y∈Rm cannot
be scrambled directly by Φ∈Rm×n without dimensional
variation. To solve this problem, one feasible way is to
select a group of random atoms from Φ to form an
m×m scrambling matrix. But the selection schedule will
bring about additional communication load. As a conse-
quence, based on the compressed speech sensing, we8000 10000 12000
400 500 600
 and its envelope
ta and its envelope
nd compressed signal.
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together.3.2. Design of the scrambler
As mentioned above, one can hardly get any information
barely from the result if two independent signals x1 and
x2 are aliased and scrambled in the same space. As
shown in Figure 3, the original speech is thereby sepa-
rated into two parts. For the sake of the independency of
new speech segments, we set every four consecutive
frames (800 samples at sampling rate 8 kHz) as a seg-
mentation piece by considering two facts: (1) the quasi-
periodic property of speech endures about 50 ms; (2) the
auditory tolerance to delay is about 200 ms. Each cube
in Figure 3 represents such a piece.
Next, the new signals are sparsely represented over the
corresponding K–L incoherent dictionaries, and then
measured by different stochastic matrices to get the
compressed signals individually. Since using only one
fixed matrix does not always hold the restricted isometry
property [17] and will result in undesirable reconstruc-
tions, we randomly choose the matrices from the sto-
chastic matrix dictionary B={Φj: j=1, 2, . . ., L}.
Such matrix dictionary is constructed in advance. Dur-
ing the construction process, each randomly generated
stochastic matrix is tested with a group of different
speech frames. If the correct reconstruction rate of this
matrix is acceptable, it is chosen as a dictionary atom. In
this study, we set the accepting threshold of correct re-
construction rate as 80%. As a matter of fact, almost all
random matrices are CS matrices [15], thus the number
of atoms L in the dictionary can be set according to
practical requirements.
The compressed data yi are pre-reconstructed until
the final selected sensing matrices Φi, i=1, 2 ensure pre-
cise reconstruction. Similarly, let αi, i=1,2 denote the
normalized indices of these matrices in the dictionary
and let Di, i=1,2 stand for the sparsifying matrices of the
two speech parts. Then, the encrypted signal yD is






Figure 3 Sketch map of speech separation.dimensional measurement vectors with the selected
matrices Φi.
yD ¼ f y1; y2;Φ1;Φ2ð Þ ð10Þ
Subsequently, one heuristic approach is to design a
scrambling matrix schedule that is of high security to-
gether with its inverse operator for decryption. Due to the
independency of the two speech parts, their correspond-
ing measurements yi=ΦiDi
Txi, i=1, 2 are also incoherent.
We can remove any one of them by its orthocomplement
without damaging the other one. Without loss of general-
ity, we take y1 for the following illustrations.
Assume there exists a vector z from (Φ1
T)⊥ that is or-
thogonal to Φ1
T, i.e., zTΦ1=0. Multiplying z with the




DT1 x1 ¼ 0 ð11Þ
thus the y1 part comprised in y
D is eliminated. Then, we
can reconstruct x1, x2 by reconstruction algorithms and
assemble them to further obtain the recovered speech x^.
Since the operation objects are matrices and vectors in
practice, the orthocomplement designing problem turns
out to be orthogonal vector designing. Following related
linear space theories [27], z can be presented by a linear
combination of the vectors in the non-trivial NSB of Φ1,
denoted as Null(Φ1). The rank of the stochastic matrix
Φ1∈R
m×n(m<n) is m. However, the dimensions of Φ1 and
the null space of Φ1
H have following relationship
dim Null ΦT1
	 
  ¼ m dim ΦT1	 
 ¼ 0 ð12Þ
According to (12), if we choose Φi to scramble y1 and y2
directly, the two measurement parts cannot be separated
for decryption since Null(Φ1) does not exist. To ensure





∈R2mn . The dimension of Φ1
D is m.




þ dim Null Φ1D	 





H h i ¼ 2m dim Φ1D	 

¼ m ð14Þ
This ensures the existence of null space of Φ1
D and it
can be constructed by SVD: for a matrix Φ1
D ∈ R2m×n
with rank(Φ1





Then the m left singular vectors {um+1, um+1, . . ., u2m}
that correspond to the non-zero singular values are
    
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H  ¼ Span umþ1; umþ1; . . . ; u2mf g ð16Þ
where U∈R2m×2m and V∈Rm×m are unitary matrices.
Here Σ ¼ Σ10
0 0
 
, where Σ1=diag(σ1, σ2, . . ., σm),
and σi are the eigenvalues of (Φ1
D)HΦ1
D.
With (16), we obtain the NSB of (Φ1
D)H: N∈R2m×m,
denoted as N ¼ N1
N2
 
with property N1=−N2. N1, N2
are full rank matrices and therefore have inverse matri-
ces, as proved in Appendix. In this case, the matrix Φ1
D
provides available NSB. In other words, if we use the





, the inverse operator for
decryption is available.
For this consideration, the scrambling matrix is
designed as S ¼ α1I N1
N12 α2I
 
∈R2m2m to alias and dis-
order the measurements y1, y2. Here, αi are the corre-
sponding normalized indices of Φi in the dictionary B,
so that every frame of encrypted signal is aliased in dif-
ferent proportion to enhance the encryption complexity.
The identity matrix I∈Rm×m is used to adapt the dimen-




. The final encrypted signal yD is
given in (17). Every compressed part yi is scrambled and
the scrambled data are aliased with each other. The
















N12 y1 þ α2y2
ð17Þ
For communication, the encrypted data yD, the dic-
tionary parameters μi
∗, and the indices αi of sensing
matrix are transmitted to the decryption end. Then the
decryption operator can be constructed by Φi. As such,
the stochastic matrix dictionary B is also the key book
shared by both the encryption and the decryption parts.
This key book will never be exposed in the channel. In
practice, it is irregularly updated and the number of its
atoms L can adaptively be set to meet the requirements
of the system.
3.3. Decryption
Figure 5 depicts the decryption procedure. We get Φ1
with the index α1 from the transmitted data, and con-
struct the matrix S'=[N2
−1 −α2I1] with Φ1
D by SVD. The
y1 part is removed as follows.
S0⋅yD ¼ N12  α2I1
  y1 þN1y2
α1y1 þN11 y2
 






As mentioned above, N1 and N2 are full rank matrices.
With the inverse matrix N2
−1, we can get y2 by multiplying
the y1—removed data t with the matrix (N2
−1N1 −α2
2I)−1.




α2I N1½ yD ð19Þ
When the measurement vectors yi and the dictionary
parameters μi
∗ are derived, the two speech parts can be










































Figure 5 The overall framework of decryption.
Table 1 Residual intelligibilities of processed signals at
different compression rates and the corresponding MOS
scores of the recovered speech
Compression rate (%) 5 6 7 8 9 10
ρ CoS 0.964 0.967 0.957 0.959 0.975 0.967
ES 0.326 0.335 0.342 0.372 0.347 0.364
MOS 2.42 2.49 2.54 2.63 2.73 2.96
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In theory, without the key book B, it is very hard for
the eavesdroppers to decipher the encrypted signal even
though they have cryptanalyzed the encryption mechan-
ism. The strength of security is discussed in the follow-
ing section.
4. Experimental results and discussions
In this section, the performances of the proposed en-
cryption scheme are evaluated from three perspectives:
(1) the residual intelligibility of the encrypted signal; (2)
the strength of security; (3) resistance to hostile attacks.
We test over 20,000 frames of speech coming from sev-
eral speakers with unlike characteristics (gender, age,
pitch, regional accent). These test signals are taken ran-
domly from TIMIT database and are sampled at 8kHz
with length 25ms, that is, 200 samples per frame. In Sec-
tion 4.1, residual intelligibility test results and discus-
sions are presented. Section 4.2 analyzes the strength of
security, and a possible deciphering technique is consid-
ered. Section 4.3 verifies the robustness of the proposed
scheme in two conditions: in the presence of noise and
low-pass filtering (LPF).
4.1. Residual intelligibility
The amount of intelligibility left over in the encrypted
signal is measured by the envelope relevance between
the original speech and the processed signal, given as







where Eo and Ep denote the envelopes of original speech
and the processed signal, respectively. Naturally, we
interpolate the vector of Ep to reach the same dimension
as Eo due to the operation of inner production in (20).
We test two kinds of processed signal: the compressed
signal (CoS) and the encrypted signal (ES).
According to the experimental statistics, when the com-
pression rate (m/n) is above 5%, the salient information of
speech can be captured, and acceptable reconstructionquality is derived with the K–L incoherent dictionary. On
the other hand, though reconstruction quality improves
with the increasing of compression rate, it is of no signifi-
cance for signal compression with a high compression rate.
Therefore, the average residual intelligibilities are per-
formed at compression rates ranged from 5 to 10%.
As seen in Table 1, despite of the noise-like nature, the
low-dimensional measurements still retain considerable
information of the original speech. The envelope rele-
vance between the aliased, scrambled signal, and the ori-
ginal speech exhibits a dramatic decrease in terms of
residual intelligibility. In the meantime, it is noticed that
the compression rates and the residual intelligibility are
not remarkably related, which means one can choose the
compression ratio adaptively without increasing the re-
sidual intelligibility. In addition, as a subjective method
for predicting the quality of narrow-band speech, the
mean opinion score (MOS) recommended by ITU-T
P.862 [28] is adopted to evaluate the perceptual quality
of the recovered speech, and the results are also pre-
sented in Table 1 to illustrate the relationship between
speech quality and compression rate.
4.2. Strength of security
Following Shannon’s landmark article [14], the majority
of literatures on key generation may roughly be categor-
ized into four basic approaches: information theory ap-
proach, system theory approach, complexity theory
approach, and stochastic approach. Considering the key
schedule, our encryption scheme belongs to the stochas-
tic approach, and its security is generally measured by
the scale of the keyspace. Thus, the keyspace of pro-
posed scheme is analyzed in two cases to evaluate its
strength of security.
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scrambling mechanism is thoroughly unknown to the
unauthorized listener, including the key schedule, the struc-
tures of the scrambling matrix, and the sparsifying dictio-
nary. Consequently, the essential approaches for decryption
is given by
yD
S unknownð Þ g→
yi
Φi unknownð Þ g→
si
Di unknownð Þ g→x^i→x^
ð21Þ
In this case, all of the above three unknown matrices
can be regarded as the key since one cannot obtain the
original information without any one of them. Mean-
while, the extreme low residual intelligibility and the
noise-like nature of the encrypted signal have hampered
the statistical analysis methods [29]. Therefore, the most
feasible way is to search for the key, and its complexity
is directly decided by the scale of keyspace. Given the
dimensions of S, Φi, and Di, their keyspace sizes are
O 10 2mð Þ
2
 
, O(10mn), and O(10mn), respectively. These
are also the computational complexity for the searching
process.
In the second case, we assume that an eavesdropper
has a complete knowledge of the system, and has the ne-
cessary hardware to synchronize and isolate the frames.
In other words, he knows that the scrambling matrix S
can be constructed with Φi and the sparsifying matrix
Di can simply be rebuilt for its characteristic structure.
Hence, the security of the system is assumed to reside
entirely with the selection of a key Φi. For the eaves-
dropper, the only task is to find the key. Since the ran-
domness of Φi, the keyspace size is O(10
mn). In practical
situations, the speech frames is of length n=180–220
and if we choose the compression rate as 5%, the length
of compressed signal is m=9–11. Therefore, the order of
magnitude of the keyspace is about 102000.
Table 2 compares the keyspace sizes and the compression
ratios of the proposed scheme and some prior scramblers,
which employ representative key schedules, including
Hadamard matrix [4], Latin Square [6], dimensional-
variable matrix [7], and chaos system [12]. As seen in
Table 2, the proposed scheme provides larger keyspace and
requires lower communication overhead.
Now let us consider a possible deciphering technique
by dictionary learning regardless of deciphering delay. A
cryptanalyst trying to break the system may be in pos-





Compression ratio ≪1:1 1:1key book, since it is held by both the encryption and de-
cryption parts and never transmitted through the chan-
nel. He knows the complete specification of the system
(scrambling mechanism, structure of sparsifying diction-
ary); he would like to deduce the key without consider-
ing the real-time requirement.
In mathematical language, the jth encryption operation
is represented by








By wiretapping, the cryptanalyst has obtained enough
encrypted signal y(j)















fortunately, this is an optimization problem with no con-
straint conditions and thus cannot be solved, let alone the
scrambling matrix S is variable but not fixed. To say the
least, even though he is able to find some fixed S^ , he still
cannot rebuild the sensing matrix Φ. This can be verified
through Equations (15) and (16).
In fact, there would not be enough data and delay tol-
erance for cryptanalysis. For instance, in secure commu-
nications of military information or intelligence of
espionage activities, the key information is expected to
be as briefly as possible to ensure short durations.
Therefore, the dictionary learning may not be a feasible
approach in real cases.
4.3. Robustness performance
Since readily decipherable unintelligibility signals may
also be generated in large keyspace, other factors, in-
cluding bandwidth expansion, delay times, channel re-
sistance (to noise, distortion, etc.), cannot be ignored in
assessing security. Two types of attack are performed
with the encrypted signal: (1) in the presence of additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN); (2) LPF.
Representative speech scrambling schemes are chosen
to compare with the CS scheme. To be specific, the
time-domain scrambling (TDS) [5] is adopted to stand
for non-compressional scramblers. In parallel to it, the
approximate 13 line μ-law pause code modulation
(PCM) and the MELP [9] are, respectively, chosen to
represent waveform coding and parametric coding, with
respect to compressional scramblers.Latin Square [6] ASVDS [7] Chaos [12]
O(10120) O(n2) O(1064)
1:1 1:1 1:1
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http://asp.eurasipjournals.com/content/2012/1/257The MOS is chosen as the subjective criterion. In
addition, average-subsection signal-to-noise ratio (SNRseg)
[30] is adopted as the objective criterion to evaluate the
quality of recovered speech, given by (23).











xj ið Þ  x^j ið Þ
 2 and Nframe denotes
the total number of frames. The results are calculated and
averaged for a test set of approximately 100 sentences ran-
domly selected from the TIMIT database.
4.3.1. Noise resistance
AWGN is added to the encrypted signal of each scheme.
The performances of the proposed and comparative
schemes are compared. The compression ratio of CS is
set as 1:10.
As shown in Figure 6a, it is observed that CS scheme
always outperforms the comparative schemes for all
degrees of contamination. As the signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) becomes higher, the superiority of CS scheme
becomes more obvious and leads to a more favorable
comparison; the compressional schemes, including PCM
and MELP, perform worse, and these are verified by the










































Figure 6 Comparison of scramblers in the presence of AWGN. (a) MOSThe results are mainly due to the use of stochastic
matrix: it has extreme low column coherence. The stud-
ies [31,32] have shown that for a noiseless signal y=Φs,
if the K-sparse vector s satisfies sk k0 < 12 spark Φð Þ , then




1M 2K  1ð Þ
 !
ð24Þ
where spark(Φ) stands for the minimum number of col-
umns of Φ that are linearly dependent, and M is the









In a word, one can stably reconstruct the sparse vector
s with error proportional to the noise level, provided
that (1) the columns of the sensing matrix Φ are weakly
mutual correlated, and (2) the vector s is to some extent
sparse. The reason why the reconstruction error is
restricted is geometric in nature: summarily, the recon-
struction s^ is restrained within a tiny tubular wedge that
surrounds the original vector s, which ensures the stabil-
ity of recovering (for further details please refer to [31],














decrements. (b) SNRseg decrements.
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http://asp.eurasipjournals.com/content/2012/1/257relaxation can identify a sparse signal in AWGN [33],
and more sophisticated stable recovery schemes and
boundaries have been investigated [34].
Technically speaking, the waveform coding scheme
has no noise-resistant precaution and thus is vulnerable
to noise. In terms of the parametric coding scheme, the
noise will bring in errors to the feature parameters such
as pitch period and voiced/unvoiced judgment. Once
such parameters are contaminated, undesirable recon-
struct distortion happens. For reasons given above, the
noise resistance of the proposed scheme is better than
the counterparts.
4.3.2. LPF
In terms of LPF, the decrements of MOS and SNRseg
between speeches reconstructed from the filtered and
the original encrypted data are compared. Also, the
compression ratio of CS is set as 1:10.
As seen in Figure 7, CS scheme slightly outperforms
the comparative schemes when the cutoff frequency
ranges from 2400 to 2600 Hz. It gradually performs bet-
ter along with the increasing of cutoff frequency and
exhibits obvious competitive advantages. The TDS
scheme ranks in the second place and the PCM scheme
shows the worst performance.
The encrypted signal obtained from CS has dramatic-









































Figure 7 Comparison of scramblers for LPF performances. (a) MOS descrambling, thus it is of the best resistance to LPF. On
the contrary, the TDS scheme still retains some speech
structures, which makes its performances inferior to the
CS scheme. The TDS scheme outperforms the other two
comparative ones due to its robustness to time domain
perturbations [24]. As for PCM and MELP schemes,
their encoding signals have no spectral structures. All
parts of the signal share the similar importance and
therefore are vulnerable to this type of attack. Any
damages to the encrypted signal would bring about ser-
ious reconstruction errors and deteriorate the auditory
quality. As a consequence, these two schemes have the
worst robustness to LPF.
5. Conclusions
This article presented a scrambling-based speech en-
cryption algorithm via CS. A high degree of security can
be achieved due to low residual intelligibility and large
keyspace size. The immense complexity associated with
the task of finding the scrambling matrix ensures the ef-
fectiveness of encryption. It affords notable robustness
to common hostile attacks, while requires lower com-
municational costs and introduces only a slight (about
200ms) processing delay. Experimental results are
included which demonstrate the improved performance
of the scheme compared with state-of-the-art speech
scramblers. As a future work, it is planned to investigate3200 3400 3600 3800
PCM MELP




crements. (b) SNRseg decrements.
Zeng et al. EURASIP Journal on Advances in Signal Processing 2012, 2012:257 Page 11 of 12
http://asp.eurasipjournals.com/content/2012/1/257more sophisticated speech sparse representation and re-
construction algorithms to further reduce the compres-
sion ratio and improve the auditory quality of the
recovered speech.
Appendix
Proof of full rank property mentioned in Section 3.2 is
given as follows.
As for full row rank matrix P∈Rm×n(m<n), rank(P)=m,
denote its SVD as P=UΣVH, where Σ=[Σm Om×(n−m)]∈
Rm×n, Σm=diag(σ1, σ2,. . .,σm). Here U and V are m×m,
n×n unitary matrices, respectively. σi>0 denote the
square roots of non-zero eigenvalues of PHP. With the








m O nmð Þ nmð Þ




Then for Q ¼ P
P
 
¼ U0Σ0V0H∈R2mn and rank(Q)=m,
QHQ is represented as






m O nmð Þ nmð Þ




where U 0∈R2m×2m, Σ0∈R2m×n,V 0∈Rn×n.
Comparing (26) and (27), it is noticed that V 0=V, Σ0 ¼
Σm Om nmð Þ
Omn Om nmð Þ
 
and U0U0H=2I2m, where I2m de-
notes the 2m×2m identity matrix. In this case, if there is a
proper U0, the SVD of Q can be obtained. It is verified that
U0 ¼ U U
U U
 
satisfies U0U0H=2I2m, then (27) is re-
written as
QHQ ¼ 2V0 Σ
2
m O nmð Þ nmð Þ
O nmð Þ nmð Þ O nmð Þ nmð Þ
" #
V0H






Thus, with the SVD of Q=U'ΣV'H, the null space basis
of QH can be constructed.Null QH
	 









where u'm+i denotes the column vector of U'.
As the randomness of P, dim [Null(QH)]=m, namely
the NSB matrix N ¼ N1
N2
 
is a full column rank matrix.





without rank changing. Therefore, rank
(N1)=m, which means Ni, i=1, 2 are full rank matrices
and possess inverse matrices. This completes the proof.
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